Social Movements on the Net
Osvaldo León, Sally Burch, Eduardo Tamayo
ALAI, september 2001
http://alainet.org/publica/msred/

PART I
New Information and Communications Technologies: Light and Shadows

Chapter 1.
An Approach to the Debate on
the Social Implications of ICTs

ICTs and Globalization

For some time now, humanity has been going through profound transformations in the diverse orders of its social life. And it is doing so at an unprecedented rate due to the accelerated inter-penetration between technical and technological development and the social relations prevailing in the capitalist world that currently governs the planet. The dialectics of this relationship are shaping the ways we produce, work, consume, learn, make policies, inform, know, have fun, relate to the world, and even think.

In explaining this new reality, there are those who would qualify it as a “third industrial revolution,” establishing a parallel with what occurred during the second half of the 19^th Century when the second industrial revolution, born in the United States, took up where the first one, begun in late 18^th Century in England, left off. Others prefer to call it a “scientific and technological revolution,” or else an “information revolution” or “knowledge revolution,” underlining the role acquired by science and technology or – more specifically – by the new information and communications technologies as forces of production that are central to the current economic cycle. In any case, it has become common to use either name indistinctly, since they basically express the acknowledgement – rather than the conceptual clarity – that we are living in a time of substantive changes, if not a change of times, as one current of thought sustains.

In emphasizing the scope and depth of these changes, several authors coincide in stating that the capitalist world is going from an industrial economy based on steel, cars and roads to a digital economy built of silicon, computers and information superhighways.¹ Others sustain that this change means going from a social and economic organization based on the matter/energy relationship to a new one based on information and knowledge, where information is seen as an input and a product at the same time, continually accentuating the artificial, constructed dimension of social life.

The backbone of these changes is a process called “globalization.” In reality this is an imprecise term that is by no means new – since it refers to the old western-society vision of a universal empire – but no less impacting.² Be this as it may, in a general sense it refers to greater interrelations between the world’s countries due to the erosion of all types of borders and the consequent reconfiguration of decision-making mechanisms and bodies. The fact is that it is a process in which different, complex dynamics take part – while others work in the opposite direction – but whose pace and direction is dominated by the logic of a new cycle of capital accumulation, both corporate and transnational, that has found in the neoliberal ideology, at least until now, the discourse it needed to win legitimacy.

This is a new cycle, supported by technological mutation, that enables it to expand the geographic zone subordinated to capitalist accumulation, absorbing new territories and populaces, and to shorten the accrual time of capital turn-around by accelerating the circuit of production, circulation and provision of goods and services. Expansion in space and reduction in time are taking the system to its limits, with full integration of the planet in a world economy and receipt of accruals at the speed of light. It is one single planetary space where interdependence becomes inevitable, to the extreme that problems arising in one specific point, however small they may be, affect the entire system. It is also a time that unites and commits the whole system, for all of humanity is aboard this voyage to the future in the same space capsule, which could easily explode at any moment if, for example, we do not take seriously the fact that an ecological catastrophe could be just around the corner.

With globalism, states Ianni (1996: 26), “planet Earth is no longer only an astronomical body, but also an historical one. What appeared to be, or was, an abstraction, is now imposed upon many as a new reality, little known, with which we must live. Planet Earth is becoming the territory of humanity.” And he adds that “the global society is not just a reality in progress that has only just begun moving as such . . . It shows itself as visible and unknown, present and presumable, real and imaginary. In fact it is in progress, barely sketched here and there, although in other places it appears as unquestioned, obvious.” (30)

For the Brazilian author, the issue becomes a little more complex when we realize that the global society “arises in the electronic age, driven by 'informatics',” which is “made up of emissions, waves, messages, signs, symbols, networks and alliances that knit together places and activities, fields and cities, differences and identities, nations and nationalities. These are the means by which it is de-territorializing markets, technologies, capitals, merchandise, ideas, decisions, practices, expectations, and illusions.” (1996: 31)

Globalization, therefore, is an objective fact, but not so the single, inevitable meaning that the dominant free-market ideology would like to impose upon this phenomenon. Thus it is still an ambiguous process, if not a contradictory and, in any case, partial one. So much so that while the trends of these changes refer to interconnections, convergence, shortening distances, opening possibilities for the meeting of peoples and cultures, the crude reality tells us that social and geographical distances and inequalities have not stopped growing throughout the length and breadth of the world.³

The fact is that the market – the motor of this process – does not exactly march to the tune of cooperation, but of competition, where what counts for its respective stakeholders is to expand and link up their consumer niches, excluding those who do not qualify as such, in a procedure that is socially disintegrating and fragmenting. Although the virtues of the “invisible hand of the market” are declared as the paradigm organizing the contemporary world, the dialectical relationship between wealth and power has never ceased to prevail. Thus, while the peripheral countries – the ones being globalized – have “government downsizing” imposed upon them, the central countries – the ones doing the globalizing – do so by reinforcing the role of their governments. Let markets be open over there, under penalty of sanctions; over here protection is the rule. Free flow of capital, merchandise and services, severe restrictions on the movement of labor, particularly when coming from peripheral countries. In a nutshell, unprecedented concentration of power, wealth and knowledge, accompanied by unprecedented social exclusion. Globalization then, as paradoxical as it may sound, is a partial process.

In any case, ultimately what is important to point out here is that, technological mutation in the midst, a mechanism is at play that enables capitalism to restructure, renew, globalize itself, and for the first time encompass the social relations of the entire planet. Or, in other words, it has gone from intensive forms of capital accumulation within the framework of national states, to a single planetary market. This is precisely what has been called the “worldwide information society” that, in the words of the International Labor Organization (OIT, 2000: 4), “has afforded countries greater interdependence, and has combined the rapid spread of information and communications technologies (satellite, cable, radio broadcasting, telecommunications, Internet) with global integration and free trade.” Of this combination, the element that is most often highlighted is the Internet, perhaps because it is the one that offers the greatest “comparative advantages” to legitimize globalization.

Internet: the New “Object-King”

“In this society, where things are more important than people, there is an object-king, and object-driver: the automobile. Our society, call it industrial or technical, has this symbol, this thing endowed with prestige and power,” Henri Lefebvre told us in the late 60’s (1967-1971: 13). Today, in our so-called “post-industrial” society, there is no doubt that this place of honor has been completely taken over by the Internet, the emblematic expression, the icon of new information and communications technologies. The former is a reference point of the “mechanistic paradigm,” while the latter is a point of reference for the “fluid paradigm,” a leap from cruising along concrete roads and highways to surfing along “information superhighways” in “cyberspace.”

Once set upon its throne, the new object-king, as its dominions spread, is paid tribute with all honor and homage, as never seen before. There is no activity, whether social, political, sports, or cultural, that can overshadow it in terms of public exposure.

So much so, that currently there is hardly a media program that does not allude directly or indirectly to these technologies. It is a transversal axis that goes from radio stations, which frequently remind us that they are transmitting to the farthest reaches of the earth through the Network of networks, to the world of images where the Internet is an element at the height of fashion, – generally surrounded with “special effects” – including information formats, direct advertising, and a long etcetera. Thus it is that the Internet has become an integral part of our environment and collective imaginaries, regardless of whether or not we have been able to directly experiment the fascination and enchantment that it customarily projects.

Nevertheless, as Wolton (2000: 86) observes regarding these new information technologies, paradoxically “almost nobody dares criticize them nor question whether they deserve such a place in public space, on the one hand, or if they signify a progress so unquestionable that they continually summon up the imperious need to “modernize”, on the other. For many, the number of computers connected to the Internet seems to be the clearest index of a country’s development, and even its degree of intelligence . . . In any case, this identification of progress with new techniques is there, massive, omnipresent in the discourse of politicians, the media and the elite. Furthermore, these discourses have such a heavy impact because they all go in the same direction.”

That is why, he adds, when we speak of the success of these technologies, we must “remember that it is a mixture of reality and fantasy and that the unprecedented enthusiasm that surrounds them will necessarily be much more nuanced in ten years, when its uses will have made the inflamed speeches of today relative.” (highlighting by the author)

In fact, this “unheard of enthusiasm” is nothing new, but rather a constant that has manifested itself with the appearance of each new technological innovation in the communications field.⁴ The novelty, in any case, is in the ubiquity of such discourses that revive technological determinism by assigning a causal role to the new communications technologies in the historical process, that is, the assumption that the latter have now become the motor of history, leaving aside any consideration of social conflict.

Although this avalanche of speeches never ceases to repeat that ICTs will profoundly transform our lives, what is surprising is that in consequence, no serious, broad-based public debate has been opened on the issue. This is not due to carelessness or negligence, but to the imperatives of the logic of power that, it would seem, have found in the Internet and new communications technologies the friendliest face for selling economic globalization, since for broad sectors of the world’s population the only link to globalization occurs at a symbolic or media level. Thus the “admixture of reality and fantasy” that characterizes such talk.

By the same token, for social organizations and other citizens’ entities that aspire to design communications policies taking full advantage of the Internet’s potential, it is essential to go beyond the promotional hype and objectively get to the bottom of the characteristics and dynamics of ICTs, with the understanding that their formalization will depend on forces in play and their surrounding conditions.

After all, knowing the terrain and the scope of action is a prerequisite to any strategic formulation, or at least knowing how the waves are coming in – following the “surf” image that has become popular when referring to Web searches – and trying to dominate and keep on top of them . . . ultimately, in order not to be swallowed by them.

In effect, there are several factors that differentiate ICTs from earlier communications systems, from their unique technological characteristics to the new ways of using and implementing made possible by them. Nevertheless, the prevailing discourse tends to confuse these levels, making the forms of application look like an inevitable result of the technology itself. Thus the importance of separating the two.

Password: Convergence

Underlying the rapid development of the new information and communications technologies during the past two decades are two central technical components. One is digitalization, which makes it possible to translate all types of information – data, texts, sound, images, video, codes, computer programs – into computer language with a coding system based on a binary sequence of packages of “0” and “1”, or “bits” (binary digits). The other has to do with the extraordinary progress in electronic components: semiconductors, integrated circuits, transistors and microprocessors. The rest are mere applications.

With this common language, it has been possible to create protocols that enable different computers to share information that, when integrated with telecommunications systems and network technology, make it possible to transmit all types of messages through the same channel, thus laying the foundation for the new information and communications technologies. This integration of technologies is what has sustained the logic of technological convergence, which is a fundamental characteristic of ICTs.

This in turn is the principal difference between digital systems and the earlier “analog” ones that needed differentiated channels, each with a different type of technology. With digitalization, one can transmit the same messages indistinctly through the telephone network, data transmission networks, satellite systems, cable TV, radio-electric waves, etc. This makes it a versatile technology in terms of the infrastructure and channels required, giving it its characteristic flexibility.

The logic of convergence also goes from technology to the way it is applied. Thus for example, simultaneous handling of text, audio, video, images and data has given way to multimedia, which is not just a juxtaposition of media types, but their hybridization. Consequently, the once clear differences between these kinds of media: print, radio, TV, etc. start to blur, giving way to a convergence between these media, and between them and the Internet, a phenomenon that is bringing about a rethinking of each medium.

In turn, and as a consequence of the above, we are also witnessing a convergence of services; to mention only a few examples: telephone connections to Internet, cable TV telephony, Internet television, MP3, etc. Furthermore, with the new information-linking possibilities of hypertext and the World Wide Web, it is possible as never before to link, for example, documentation centers and other sources of information.

Another peculiar characteristic of ICTs is that, by making it possible to transmit in real time to any point on the planet, they take a dizzying leap in compression of time and space, with repercussions in the way social identities and roles are currently defined.⁵ There are authors, such as De Rosnay (1999: 10), who think that it is precisely the new sense of space and time, and not technological supply, that is changing individuals, mentalities and social structures.

Looking in perspective, Pierre Lévy (1997: 36) states that one of the trends of technical evolution is “the exponential increase in material performance (speed of calculation, memory capacity, transmission volume) combined with a continual decline in prices.” Besides this, the programs are much more user-friendly. In Levy’s opinion, all this leads us to suppose that these three tendencies, that is “this continual movement towards greater capacity, lower costs and more openness” will continue in the future; however, he warns that it is impossible to predict the qualitative mutations that this wave will support, nor how society will appropriate it or modify it.

Internet Instruments

Today, the Internet is by far the most visible expression of these new technologies, and the fastest growing one.⁶ It is not in itself a communications medium (although many media enter its embrace), but rather a network that, through a universal protocol (TCP-IP), interconnects different computer networks worldwide that are divided into fully autonomous nodes and servers. That is why it is also known as the Network of networks, whose main characteristic is to have enabled many-to-many communications for the first time in real or chosen time.

Communication is achieved using different instruments developed with this technology. In general terms, two main instruments can be differentiated: one is electronic mail, the transmission of different types of messages to private addresses; and the other, the World Wide Web (WWW), a universal system of links between documents. Each responds to a different functionality, although from a technological viewpoint, the differences between the two are sometimes blurred (for example, with Web mail services or discussion lists).

Of course there are other Internet instruments, some on their way out (gopher, telnet) and others growing (Chat, Net2phone), that we will not discuss here since their use by social organizations of Latin America and the Caribbean is minimal.

Electronic Mail: “E-mail” is the most-used instrument on the Internet. It makes it possible to communicate with people or organizations, bilaterally or multilaterally, through computers connected to the network. That is, the computer is the instrument, but interaction is almost always between human beings.

Its main uses are correspondence and exchange lists. These interactions usually take place between persons or organizations with pre-established relations or common interests, and the exchange generally follows a chronological sequence (that is, the timeliness of messages is immediate and temporary). Distribution lists in turn enable the dissemination of information to multiple recipients, who can choose to read or erase them, but not ignore their existence (as can happen on the Web). This feature, wisely used, provides a very large scope to rapidly reach selected audiences. But it is also very easy to abuse, creating a new problem of information overload and saturation, with the consequent need to develop discrimination and selection capabilities and mechanisms.

In terms of analogical comparison, e-mail is similar to the telephone and postal service; but it adds something new: the ability to communicate as a network. That is, from any point on a given network, one can communicate directly to all other points, with the same ease (and at no additional cost) as with bilateral communications. This means that, for the first time, there is access to the possibility of decentralized communications, the advantages of which have been seen in practice in many networking dynamics, from businesses to citizen experiences.

The World Wide Web: “WWW” refers to the Internet web that links texts, whose main – and innovative – characteristic is hypertext; that is, the system of links based on a universal code, that offers great ease for creating connections among documents, data, references, initiatives, spaces, objects, multimedia, etc. Each of these items may be located through its unique address or URL (Universal Resource Locator).

Travelling through cyberspace, the internaut sets his or her own course to access sites of interest. As Antulio Sánchez (1998) describes it, “Information items are not connected linearly as in a paper text, but extend in connections towards an interminable labyrinth. Neither are they referred to data assigned to a specific memory, since documents are disseminated in different servers located in different regions of the planet. In this way, to navigate the Web is to move through a ‘map’ as complicated as imagination can make it, but each link opens onto a series of networks. ”

In contrast with e-mail, in most cases navigating the Web does not imply interacting with people. Rather it is a relationship that the person establishes, from his or her computer, with other computers and sources of information. In this way, temporality (accessing new or stored information) remains under individual criteria and control. By analogical comparison, it is similar to services provided by publishers, the press, bookstores, and libraries.

The ability to establish an infinite number of navigation routes is radically changing not only the way information is accessed, but also how it is produced and presented. As occurs with every innovation, the tendency is for the production of contents to begin within the parameters of previous media forms, and then to discover and explore new horizons. Moving forward we can anticipate the development of new formats that break out of the rigid, temporal, sequential mold of conventional communications media.

Some analysts even believe that, since each cybernaut could develop his or her own texts with fragments gathered while surfing the Web, we are witnessing a redefinition of the author-reader, reading-writing relationship. Or, in the words of Benjamin Wooley (1993: 165), “In cyberspace, everyone is an author, which means that no one is an author.”

The other distinctive characteristic of the Web is its graphic interface, with the possibility to include design, illustrations, multimedia, non-Latin alphabets, etc. No doubt this feature has been one of the factors in its great popularity, thus unleashing the business development of the Internet.⁷

Another difference between these two main instruments of the Internet, from the perspective of information dissemination, is that whereas e-mail reaches its destination directly, the only people who enter a Web site are those who are actively seeking the information it contains. In consequence, Internet dissemination strategies also need to be differentiated. In the first case, one tries to dose out information in order to avoid overload. In the second case, the mass of information – or links – in a single place is more a factor that attracts internauts, in order to find what they seek more rapidly.

To complete the picture: Cyberspace

However, instruments are not everything. The term “Internet” is used indistinctly to refer to the worldwide mesh of computers that are interconnected by land or satellite networks, and/or a mixture of the two, as well as the information flows and even the human dynamics that are generated in this space, due to its interactive, polyvalent nature. The thing is that, in contrast with other communications systems, in the case of the Internet the dividing lines between the transmitter, the transmitted content, the channel by which it is transmitted, and the receiver, are not always clear.⁸ This confusion is one of the factors leading to an exaggerated emphasis on connectivity itself, above and beyond other elements of communication.

That is why many analysts underline the need to differentiate between the “network” as such and what Michael Ogden (1998: 67, 73) calls the “social construction” surrounding the Internet, which according to him is like an “agora” or “virtual polis.” Others use the term “cyberspace” to refer to this virtual reality. Cyberspace would actually be a new dimension of space that is not delimited by geographic boundaries.

Origins of the Internet

As with the most important technological innovations seen over the last few decades, what today is known as the Internet was born in the cradle of the US industrial military complex, with the participation of university research centers, as part of experimental programs to maintain a decentralized communications system in case of a nuclear attack. Specifically, it was in 1969 that the first functional network, Arpanet, appeared, whose development attracted the interest and motivation of the scientists and technicians involved – more than any demand for military applications – who practically set up the first “virtual community” to share their knowledge and together give form to this new technology.

Later it extended to the rest of the academic community, where it grew and flourished, precisely as a resource for sharing information and scientific findings, including of course those destined to improve the tool itself.

Due to the potential it offered for sharing information freely, by the 80’s this technology was embraced by citizen organizations to support their specific causes, giving rise to the innovative development of applications in many parts of the world, first as local bulletin boards, and then experimenting with ways to communicate across borders and oceans.

In any case, it was these two venues⁹ that produced the technological developments that buttressed what is now the Internet, with the peculiarity that their users were influential in this process, insofar as from the start there was a sense of exchange and cooperation even in the improvement of the technological support that made this type of interaction feasible.

It was in the year ‘90 when the Internet appeared as a worldwide net of interconnected networks. Three years later, the World Wide Web would take it upon itself to project its nature as a “global showcase,” unleashing an unprecedented expansive boom. That was when the business sector decided to enter this arena and consequently contend for the command exercised by those who had been piloting the development and operational management of this technology: the academic, governmental and citizen sectors. Until then, its use for commercial purposes was not allowed, and there were parallel networks for this purpose (banking network, telephone company data transmission network, private electronic mail services, etc.).

In 1994, these technologies acquired their “citizen status” when, during the conference of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Argentina, US ex vice-president Al Gore developed the proposal of making them the pillar of tomorrow’s society, the “information society” made popular under the name of “information superhighway.” This project foresaw the integration of all existing networks into a single system. The Internet is – on a small scale – one possible model of that eventual superhighway: an ownerless public venue facilitating communications mainly for non-commercial purposes. But it is faced with a powerful contender: market forces that aim to turn this highway into a huge shopping center under private dominion.

In February, 1995, the group of the seven wealthiest countries in the world, the G7, adopted the “superhighway” project with two central policy principles: liberalization and universal access. Up to that point, a certain equilibrium was maintained between what the Internet is today and the proposal of a global shopping center. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the advocates of liberalization have a very powerful lobby; universal service does not.

Since then, there has been accelerated business expansion on the Internet, thereby introducing a logic distinct from that which predominated during its development. Even so, the Internet’s baptism in citizen’s and academic venues has meant that this space has maintained – up to now – its character as an ownerless open forum, a characteristic having little to do with dominant business dynamics.

In a way, this new logic leads back to the beginning: the Arpanet project driven by military concerns, whose setup reflects a hierarchical, centralized, vertical, controlled network. It implies acknowledgement of the development of the Internet, but not of the dynamics and factors that gravitated in it. As if to say, we are grateful for the sense of cooperation and the joint effort that enabled the development of this technology, but that is as far as it goes. Now that it is in our hands, we are the ones who will impose the rules. So if this is the way things are moving, then one wonders, will it be possible for the decentralized setup of the Network of networks to withstand the contrary trends propelled by monopolist concentration, operating especially in the world of communications?

Corporate Concentration

One of the differences of the current “technological revolution” in the field of communications, in contrast with former ones, is that for the first time it is directly linked to the spearhead of the economy. This is because the bearing new technologies have had on processes of development and globalization, and their dizzying growth, have made this sector a source of wealth that is attractive to large transnational corporations.

Under these conditions, there has been an unprecedented concentration of property by companies in the sector, as a mechanism to ensure their ability to compete. That is, they have gone from traditional integration strategies – whether horizontal or vertical – to mergers aimed to achieve a greater margin for maneuvering to maximize the complementarity or “synergies” of various divisions, in order to gain exclusive control over the largest possible slice of the market.

This is how we arrive at the appearance of “moguls” with ramifications in the four corners of the world, set up through the fusion of printed media, television chains, cable TV, movies, software, telecommunications, entertainment . . . even tourism, among others.¹⁰ In this way, their companies’ products and services can advertise each other through different branches, thus expanding their respective “niches”, since as Ogden (1998: 76) observed, “big business ... is not interested in free markets; rather, it wants captive markets.”

Wisconsin University researcher Robert McChesney states that the global communications market has been dominated by the same eight transnational corporations that dominate the sector in the US: “General Electric, AT&T,/Liberty Media, Disney, Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom and Seagram, plus Bertelsmann, the Germany-based conglomerate.” (1999)

In this wise, a panorama has begun to emerge in which communications development is subject to the profitability considerations of a handful of mega-corporations, outside of all possibility of public control. The consequences of this phenomenon are countless, starting with the fact that, with economic profit criteria at the forefront, the social function of communications media is practically on the tightrope, having been relegated to business convenience.¹¹

To be brief, let us refer to the words of Gerald Levin, vice-president of the AOL-Time Warner giant, who acknowledged in public declarations that such mega-corporations have become more important than governments, educational institutions, or any other sector of society. That is saying a mouthful.¹²

From this position of power, to complete the picture, what appears as the central item on these corporations’ wish list for the future is to expand their domains to the electromagnetic spectrum – which personal computers, wireless Internet, mobile telephony, beepers, radio and television all depend on to send and receive messages – demanding its privatization, as up to now it has remained a “universal common asset” under state ownership and administration.

So under this tendency, the new possibilities and virtues that ICTs supposedly bring become vague and uncertain. One of the most fervent theoreticians of their positive aspects, Pierre Lévy (1997), foreseeing this issue, hurried to point out that the discourse of economic liberalism promoted by Bill Gates of Microsoft, among others, foretells the Internet’s future as an immense supermarket where free competition will prevail in a transparent market (246). He asks, however, whether the liberal discourse might not be an ideological excuse for the domination of large communications groups that “will make life tough for small producers and for the promotion of diversity” (283).

Promises and Realities

Business is Business

Along with the accelerated expansion of the Net’s business side, hand in hand with large corporations and the investments only they can make, in the world of ideas a legitimizing promotional discourse has spread emphasizing electronic business opportunities and consumer advantages (how to plug into the new millenium from your home, so to speak), rather than its benefits in areas such as education, knowledge, adult learning, health, transparent public information, and democracy, which the concept of the “information superhighway” was careful to highlight.

In a study done in the United States, Norman Solomon found that, whereas in 1995 the major newspapers referred to the “information superhighway” in 4,562 articles and only 950 times to “electronic business,” by 1999 this ratio had reversed substantially, the superhighway being mentioned 842 times while 20,641 articles spoke of e-business.¹³

Michael Ogden (1998: 74-78) points out that three “visions” currently compete for first place in society. The first, especially present in governmental rhetoric, vindicates the “information society,” putting emphasis on “the primacy of individual liberty and the commitment to pluralism, diversity, and community.” The second is promoted by large companies and is like what television is today as a consumer product, with the promise of entering the information era through broad-band home connections, with a choice of 500 channels. This discourse, according to Ogden, seeks to “marginalize alternative visions while simultaneously trying to allay concerns over their proposed mega-mergers” between the branches of communications and entertainment. The third vision – which the author calls “a staged transition” – places the community of users at the head of technological changes and developments. It emphasizes interactivity and provides for gradual development of technological requirements, as a function of the growth of real needs.

Ogden believes that the “winner” will be whoever sells its image best to the financial community, decision-making bodies and the public, although “the actual outcome could conceivably contain aspects of each vision and yet be completely different from all three.” (75)

What cannot be expected is that, just because it is a new space, this result will be defined leaving aside the interests, power plays and social contradictions present throughout society; and yet precisely what characterizes the dominant discourse of the Internet is the absence of references to social conflict. There is talk of a “digital divide,” but it is not linked to the inequalities inherent in today’s social-economic system.

Furthermore, this discourse attributes characteristics to ICTs, such as transparency, horizontality, interactivity, the ability to democratize information and its dissemination, unlimited access to knowledge and thus equal development, which are not inherent to the technology but are potentialities (among many others) whose realization depends on how it is implemented in the framework of a given social project.

The Supply of Knowledge

The Internet has made it possible for each point connected to the network to place all the information it has available. Although this does not necessarily happen one hundred percent, the fact is that the mass of information on line is growing exponentially.

Its simplest version, broadly disseminated by the promotional hype, has attempted to establish that the abundance of information is in and of itself synonymous with an enrichment of knowledge, establishing an almost direct causal relationship between the use of new technologies providing access to the mass of information available in cyberspace, and access to knowledge – and therefore to education and development.¹⁴

When we consider that knowing is a complex human process of selection, processing, discernment, intuition and analysis on the basis of accumulated experience, it becomes evident that access to information is only one component. For information to become knowledge, we must have it at the right time and in the right format for a given need or context, and also have the right conditions for using it. These conditions include a broad scope of sociocultural, economic and political factors.

As Lucien Sfez pointed out: “The inequality of knowledge cannot be reverted by the virtues of the Internet into general equality. ( . . . ) Because information is not knowledge. In order to find the correct information, one must have prior knowledge that makes it possible to ask the right questions . . . of information.” (1999: 22)

Being one of the errors induced by the Internet’s promotional discourse, let us delve deeper into what Sartori says in this regard: “Informing is providing news, and this includes news on notions. Even so we must point out that information is not knowledge, not knowing in the heuristic sense of the term. In and of itself, information does not make us understand things: one can be very informed on many matters, and yet not understand them. It is correct, then, to say that information only provides notions. This is not bad. So-called notional knowledge also contributes to the formation of homo sapiens. But if notional knowledge is not to be slighted, neither should we overrate it. The accumulation of notions, I repeat, does not imply an understanding of them.” (1998: 79; author’s italics)

The access = knowledge equation also intends to pass off an implicit valuation of a type of “universal” knowledge that can be coded in the form of digitizable information, like positive sciences, above other types of knowledge that are less formal or quantifiable but not thereby less valuable. Andreas Credé and Robin Mansell (1998: 11) make a distinction between “formal” and “tacit” knowledge, the latter including, among other things, personal experience, intuition, or wisdom, which are not always digitizable. Both types of knowledge – formal and tacit – are valuable and necessary for human activities and development, insist Credé and Mansell, adding that, “Evidence from both industrialized and developing countries suggests that success in building new capabilities depends on continuous investment in the technical and social infrastructure, organizational change, flexibility conducive to new methods of learning, and strengthened capabilities to generate and use 'tacit' knowledge (or local experience).”

The fact is, where these conditions are developed, the possibilities of taking full advantage of available resources – on the Internet or others – may be greater than when such bases are not available, which refutes the idea that access to information might, alone, unleash knowing processes. Nevertheless, when it is possible to develop these conditions, there is no doubt that the Internet can be a very valuable instrument for the development of knowledge.

Universal Access

As was said earlier, liberalization and universal access were the basic components of policies adopted by the governments of the most powerful countries in the world, assembled in the so-called Group of Seven (G7) when, in the Brussels meeting of 1995, they adopted the “information superhighway” project, later to be ratified at the Okinawa Summit (Japan) in July 2000, this time by the G8 that now included Russia.

Although concrete policy measures have tended basically towards deregulation and liberalization of markets concerned with the Internet, rather than protecting the general weal, the promise of universal access – understood essentially as connectivity – is recurrent in international political scenarios, as confirmed by the recent Americas Summit (Quebec, April 2001), as a legitimating ingredient of the “information society.”

Universal access is presented as a panacea for closing the digital divide that threatens to deepen social inequalities, because those who are connected to the Internet maintain a growing advantage over those who are not. Therefore, the only solution would be to give everyone access to enjoy the same advantages. Evidently, this reasoning overlooks the economic and structural causes of social inequality.

But also, as pointed out by Lucien Sfez, the very concept of Internet universality is prey to a mystification of its possibilities. The Internet is supposed to be “becoming universalized” (i.e. an asset of all of humanity), when it would be more correct to speak of a generalization (i.e., reaching a large number of entities or persons). “Talking to everyone and having access to all knowledge, as the internauts claim, can only be understood as a generality transformed mythically into a universality. In sum, it is a metaphor,” states the author, who believes that from that point “doubt starts to invade us regarding the capacity of the Internet network to serve democracy, i.e., the liberty and equality that define its contours.” How much more so if in order to access that space one must pay a “toll.” (1999: 21-22)

In order to achieve the goal of universal access, governments are assigned the task of preparing the terrain for private and public development of national and global information systems. Implementation, though, is left increasingly in private sector hands, whose main concern is with social strata that can become the consumers of services and users of applications. This means that, in practice, this universality will arrive through expansion mechanisms that do not favor equality of conditions, since the laws of the market bend towards those who can pay and exclude those who cannot. That is to say, it is a bizarre, rhetorical universality, as it only contemplates the few, pushing aside the notion of citizenship to make way for the figure of consumers.

This line, obviously, leaves out of the game all possibility of promoting the creation of mechanisms by which citizen sectors may influence policy-making. Qualified as a technical area, decision-making vis-a-vis ICTs becomes the prerogative of “experts” and “investors.” That is, an enclosed area where citizen intervention simply has no room. If not, why are neither governments nor communications media concerned with opening a public debate on the visions and social implications of the supposed “information society,” nor do they admit that there are contrary interests at play, ignoring those not in line with dominant interests?

Actually, broad access to new technologies has been a demand of civil society sectors for several years. These groups defend the validity of truly universal access, but in order to differentiate this from official positions, some emphasize “democratic access” or “equitable access,”¹⁵ a concept that seeks to take into account factors of unequal conditions, not only in connectivity but also in terms of the starting point or initial conditions, the possibilities of using the information, sharing knowledge, among others.

This demand is an answer to the evidences that the technological gap, a direct consequence of the other social and geographical gaps, might in turn deepen them. There is fear, not ungrounded, that as the spear head activities in economy, education, and even some aspects of political and social life start switching over to cyberspace, those without access run the risk of being left behind in terms of development and democratic participation. As Gómez and Martínez point out, “inequalities in the distribution of power and resources can continue to increase in the real world, as they are mirrored in the virtual one.” (2001: 10) An answer solely from ICTs will not be able to change these imbalances.

Information as a Commodity

On one hand, the official discourse by northern governments and multilateral agencies acknowledges that Internet has the potential to carry unlimited information, underlining their commitment to ensuring everyone has free access to it and to the knowledge it disseminates. On the other hand, they themselves are the first proponents of establishing regulatory frameworks that contradict such purposes, in particular regarding intellectual property rights, which include patents and copyrights, whose main purpose is to safeguard the interests of investors, rather than to protect inventors, authors, or the public wellbeing.

One of the special peculiarities of information is that it is easy to copy and share, regardless of whether it is presented in the form of books, videos, software, CDs . . . or whether it is ideas, designs, inventions, or genetic data. This being the down side of the information business, in order to preserve the super-earnings of corporations involved in the sector – very weighty to be sure –, the response of the power structure has been to turn to the regulatory environment through intellectual property rights, in order to establish throughout the length and breadth of the world a legal framework based on a new sense of ownership that mostly benefits monopolies.

Were this logic to be imposed, there is a risk that access to certain information could be privatized, restricting public use of data bases for cultural, educational or scientific purposes. Such intents have already been expressed in inter-governmental discussions regarding intellectual property rights in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The European Union, for example, since 1996 applies sui generis norms to its data bases: it no longer bases copyrights on originality, but on “invested economic resources and/or time, efforts or energy spent.” These norms allow for the privatization of data bases in virtue of intellectual property rights, forbidding the extraction and reutilization of information for 15 years. Whoever wishes to access information must pay the price set by the new knowledge monopolies.

According to the market rules, the type of information and knowledge that is governed by intellectual property rights has greater value than local or private knowledge, and the type coming from the centers of power is worth more than that coming from the periphery. This does not mean that the same information cannot change categories, as is the case with indigenous knowledge of bio-diversity, which only acquires “value” when patented by transnational companies.

However, the development of Internet itself, because of the way it happened – users, scientists and technicians sharing knowledge in order to progressively improve the technology – goes against this concept of information as a private asset. The gratuity of most information sources in this medium, the great ease with which it is copied and reproduced infinitely, and the absence of geographical borders in cyberspace, among others, are a clear expression of this path.

As already stated, there is a patent incompatibility between the commercialization of information and the nature of information itself. That is why a long debate has been kept open, which among other things lead the father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, to point out that the treatment of information as a commodity can only end in an impasse; the value of information is first and foremost non-commercial, linked on the one hand to its ability to circulate and on the other to its transparency. Wiener attempted to demonstrate the absurdities and dysfunction of private information monopolies, especially with regard to esthetic and scientific information, which necessarily depends on working together. Commenting Wiener, Jean Lokjine (1992: 14-15) points out that “Information thus created, which is based on increasingly collective work, cannot be conserved, much less enriched, if it is privately owned: it looses its ‘value’ (for use), following the law of entropy when simply accumulated and stored like merchandise.”

The “shareware” movement, for example, follows this line of thought, with “Linux” as its best known reference point.¹⁶ It has recently scored some important points: several governments have passed – or are about to pass – legal provisions implementing its use in different public agencies – except when there is no other option but to use proprietary software; and in turn companies of the sector such as IBM and Samsung have followed this current.

Shareware, as opposed to proprietary software, is not only free of license fees, but its development is not controlled by a single company. That is, the property license for shareware does not limit its transfer, distribution, use, and even alteration of its original characteristics. Thus, nobody is at the mercy of anyone, and all can work on fine-tuning the desired functions, provided they share their innovations. This counteracts the practice of the retainers of proprietary programs who periodically “renew” their versions, generally by introducing “niceties” that are of no interest to most users, in order to promote new sales of an old product. Furthermore, it decreases the need to have to buy new equipment to meet the technical demands of successive versions of the same software placed on the market.

So while on the one hand the official discourse speaks of free access to information and knowledge, on the other hand, their policies are in practice influenced by power sectors – i.e., mega-corporations – that are pushing for restrictions; citizen movements, meanwhile, simply try to get the rhetoric to translate into realities. And it is in this relationship of forces at play – unequal to be sure – that legal regulations may tip the balance to favor market forces. This is the case of law drafts, being discussed in several countries, that seek to protect e-business by establishing norms that with one pen-stroke could do away with free on-line information services. Should this tendency prevail, could it be that in the future the Internet will give us two options: either banal information for free, or quality information at a price?

More Democracy: for Whom?

Al Gore (1994), ex US vice-president, in his defense of ICT virtues that set the tone for the official discourse on the “information society” destined to usher in a “new Athenian era of democracy,” sustained that: “The Global Information Infrastructure will not only be a metaphor for a functioning democracy, it will in fact promote the functioning of democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens in decision making. And it will greatly promote the ability of nations to cooperate with each other.”

The advocates of this “cyber-democracy” foresee a great expansion in the exercise of freedom of speech and citizen participation, through on-line consultations that will orient policy decisions: voting will no longer be only every four or five years, but rather an ongoing activity, which would practically mean the evaporation of all social mediation in the democratic order. For all practical purposes, it is at this level that rhetoric brings into play the equation information = knowledge.

Generally speaking, this discourse overlooks the fact that freedom of speech does not simply mean being able to speak on or decide between predefined options, but that to be effective, it requires the ability to articulate a discourse, develop proposals, confront and debate them with others, and have a voice through public dissemination media. And in order to form an intelligent opinion capable of influencing public decisions, one needs to be duly informed, which means accessing pluralistic, independent, socially responsible communications media.

In this regard, in his exploration of the advent of the “electronic republic” in the United States, Lawrence Grossman (ex president of NBC News and the US Public Broadcasting Service) warns of the excessive bearing that media profits can exert in defining public dialogue: “The growing disparity in the quality of information that is available to some citizens compared to others has a corrosive effect on the democratic deliberative process, on people’s ability to make sound judgements, and on the public’s faith in the integrity of the political system.” (1995: 182) Grossman likewise expresses concern for the risks to a democracy that gives too much importance to public opinions that are instantaneous, unmeditated, uninformed, and fractured into single-topic pressure groups. He concludes that “it is essential that urgent steps be taken to improve the quality of citizen deliberation in the pubic sphere.” (1995: 189)

Is it true that the Internet will establish itself as a pluralistic venue for information and public debate? Although initially it stirred hopes in this sense, as the president of the International Federation of Journalists pointed out in an ILO symposium in 2000, these hopes were dashed in three short years, as the players who dominate traditional media are "now increasingly dominant in on-line media. In almost every country, the most accessed sites are the sites owned by traditional media. About 80% of on-line content creators are employed by old media companies”. (Quoted by Modoux, 2000)

Therefore, although it is true that the Internet is also a haven for pluralistic, independent, alternative voices and media, and that they have unprecedented possibilities for networking, facilitating debates and reaching new audiences, these venues could very well be cornered by the publishing power of traditional media, whose contents in most cases are determined by market demands which, as Grossman commented (1995: 215), “severely limits the quality of information and diversity of ideas. It looks upon people as consumers, not citizens. It favors audiences with money to spend. The marketplace caters to the requirements of advertisers. . . It has little incentive to fulfill the public’s need for civic education and serious information about public affairs and controversial issues.”

. . . Or Greater Control?

When speaking of ICT implications for democracy, what is practically left out is that their peculiar characteristics can also be used to advantage for undemocratic ends, such as the systematic violation of private correspondence, or the storage and sale of personal data without permission. These technologies offer unprecedented capabilities to trace people’s behavior, tastes and interests, relationships, and other intimate data, an ability that is being exploited by both governments and companies. They also enormously facilitate espionage activities (whether political or business), besides supervision and control of citizens. Some of these ICT aspects, absent in the promotional discourse, are actually an integral part of official projects, and we are not necessarily speaking here of authoritarian regimes, but of western democratic governments.

Not a few writers have evoked, in this regard, the image of George Orwell’s “Big Brother”; but in contrast with the Orwellian novel (1984), whose scenario is a highly centralized system, today’s system is polycentric and everything indicates that supervision activities will be carried out secretly and with the cooperation (but not consent) of the people, who enthusiastically use the instruments at their disposal, without asking themselves who is watching.

The case of the “Echelon” espionage network has evidenced the unprecedented possibilities of spying that are opened up with ICTs. An investigation of the European Parliament has confirmed the existence of this sophisticated network of communications espionage operating on a global scale. In operation at least since 1988 (some sources mention that its antecedents go back as far as an agreement in 1948), Echelon was set up by Anglo-Saxon countries (the United States, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia), under the direction and execution of the US National Security Agency (NSA). It has a powerful infrastructure able to intercept, through an estimated 120 satellites at least, fleets of military planes, submarines and other means, practically any information transmitted by electronic mail, fax and telephone from any point on the planet. Powerful computers scan communications in search for key words, phrases, persons and places, but can also systematically control the communications of certain pre-identified sources.

Designed to collect intelligence during the cold war, the European report shows that Echelon is being used to intervene personal and business communications. In the first case, there is evidence of espionage against human rights organizations, among others. As for business espionage, cases have been reported where North American companies have taken large contracts away from European contenders by obtaining confidential information, such as the case in 1998 of the US firm Raytheon that obtained a contract that the French Thomson had almost secured for the sale of radars to Brazil for the System of Vigilance of the Amazon Basin (SIVAM).

Since 1995, member countries of the European Union have been implementing the Enfopol espionage program, and are getting ready to approve a regulatory body that, among other points, provides that each telephone call, fixed or mobile, every fax and electronic message, all Web page contents and network use, no matter where it is produced or by whom, shall be duly registered, filed and available for a period of at least seven years.

In the UK, with the law to prevent international crime passed in the year 2000, many of these provisions are already in effect, such as the power granted to security corps to intercept electronic communications without a court order and the obligation of Internet service providers to deliver the codes for encrypted messages from their users upon request by the authorities.

In the United States, “electronic snooping” is practiced intensively, both by companies and by governmental security agencies, to watch over groups and movements perceived as a threat to the system. “At least 70% of all major employers monitor the mail and Internet use of their employees, keep hidden video cameras and watch worker movements in work centers” (Velásquez, 2001). Generally, espionage services of employers and the police coincide, and both act under the goal of keeping work centers “union-free.”

Another threat that hovers over citizens is the compilation of data bases with personal information, that could be used to violate privacy rights, or the risk of errors and exclusions for those registering unfavorable personal data. These data banks are also in high demand by companies wanting to identify population segments to promote their products and services, for which hardware and software suppliers have even attempted to include devices in personal computers that identify users and trace their navigation history, all without asking permission.

If some countries like those of the European Union and Canada have taken the trouble to legislate, at least partially, individual rights at this level, others provide no protection at all. Mathieu O’Neil warns against the time when people’s private lives could become a consumer commodity. The right to privacy would be sold at a price to those who can afford it. We would then see the advent of “a private life market, where internauts eager for privacy would pay a pretty penny for data security” from their service providers, while “the less wealthy, owners of ‘second rate’ confidential information, would naturally be the intimacy poor.” (2001: 25)

However, due to the decentralized, multifunctional nature of the Internet and the circumstances in which it developed, so far it has not been controllable and has become a disputed territory, where powerful political, financial and commercial interests vie for an Internet whose main functions are monitoring, advertising and selling (Ramonet, 2001: 21), while citizen’s and democratic interests seek to make it an instrument serving democracy, sustainable development, science, culture, education and health.

Faced with attempts, on the one hand, to invade citizen privacy and, on the other, to commercialize the Internet to the point of subjecting everything to mercantile criteria, a new front of social struggle is emerging that seeks to preserve information freedom and citizen privacy in cyberspace.¹⁷ In this framework there are numerous projects and initiatives to democratize the Internet. Nevertheless, these proposals have little echo in the media, and this debate hardly ever reaches the public scene.

The Development Gap

Can you fish with a computer? asked Frei Betto (2001a) in an article on the recent G8 Summit in Genoa, saying: “’If a man is hungry, give him a fishing pole’ states the proverb, that has now been modified by globalization as ‘give him a computer’. And fill the pockets of countries exporting cybernetic technology.” Further on he adds that the mistrust expressed by critics of this select club is because its members are not “willing to touch any aspects that mean reducing the wealth of their nations. That is why computers are presented as the new fishing poles....”

In effect, with the revival of technologism – the belief that application of innovative technologies can solve the diverse problems of the human race – on the official agenda of development, the dominant approach is that through access to ICTs, “backward” countries could rapidly accelerate their pace to enter the world of modernity, which has now become equivalent to the “information society.”

For this transition to occur, a prerequisite is that these countries obediently adopt any measures needed to be guided by the “invisible hand of the market,” starting with the privatization and deregulation of telecommunications, the media and information services, and the adoption of legal provisions regarding intellectual property, according to the parameters established in multilateral forums and agreements (WTO, WB, ITU, WIPO, etc.), leaving aside, therefore, any consideration relating to the concept of national development and of the nation-state itself.

Under the argument that this is the inexorable march of time, even though political considerations with serious implications are at stake, its treatment has basically been imposed as a technical matter: expand connectivity in order to close or at least reduce the “digital divide.” This operation, in consequence, would ensure equal opportunities for all countries and persons to benefit from the advantages of ICTs. At a limit, it is seen as a simple matter of the necessary “plugs” and accessories, with the supposition that the rest will come as a by-product: evident opportunities for the sector’s corporations to make good business; future possibilities for the rest.¹⁸

It is true is that the issue of connectivity is very important and deserves special attention, considering that most of the planet still lacks access to telephone lines – although over a century passed by since this service began – without which it is not possible to enter the Internet world. The UNDP (2001: 42) estimates that “in the least developed countries” there is just one stationary telephone line per 200 persons.

However, the matter of connectivity, as important as it may be, is only one element of the issue. So we must ask ourselves why it is overemphasized. The reason is the supremacy of a vision of development that emphasizes international (especially economic) insertion rather than social concerns. And since the Internet is the indispensable infrastructure to enable this insertion, the important thing is for all “able points” to be connected. This follows a logic that would lead to a panorama where most countries of the South will be left adrift, excluded. Those that “qualify,” at the most might connect from “free zones” or from the cupolas of economic and political power, not that in the North there are not also large segregated regions, especially in rural areas.

So much so, that in communications, what is highlighted in the programs of the most prominent official international agencies with regard to ICTs is that they are essentially treated as “channels”, over and above any other attributes. In a study done by Karin Wilkins and Jody Waters (2000: 59) on the approach of multilateral and bilateral organizations to new communications technologies in 40 projects they support, they found that, “Overall, a transmission approach to understanding the value of communication technologies still dominates development discourse. When conceived as a tool to channel information, computers are not seen as facilitating the production of meaning. This model then subordinates project ‘participants’ to a passive role of retrieving information from existing sources, rather than projecting a more active role of constructing content for the purpose of building community or resisting powerful agencies. By framing interaction through computers as a way to access existing information, rather than to create new cultural products, this discourse loses the transformative potential of new communication technologies.”

Stubborn reality, however, by action of the forces that bear upon it, has ultimately shown that the world is more complex, being full of contradictions. Thus, in official spheres, a debate has started up on the issue, especially focused on a reading to understand the reach of the so-called “digital divide,” whether between North and South or within societies.

The Digital Gap
The digital gap covers various dimensions: geographic, demographic, socio­economic, cultural-linguistic, gender-related, etc. Expressed summarily in figures, according to the “Human Development Report 2001” of the United Nations Development Program, between 1998 and 2000 the percentage of the world population connected to the Internet rose from 2.4 % to 6.7 %, and in Latin America from 0.8 % to 3.2 % of the region's population. During the same period, the percentage of the population connected in the United States went from 26.3 % to 54.3 %. (42)
As for social differences, the UNDP recorded that worldwide, the typical Internet user is a male, under 35, with a university education and a high level of income, lives in an urban area and speaks English. That is, he is a member of a very minority elite on a global scale. (1999: 63)
Within Latin America there are also large imbalances: a study by Hilbert (2001:12-13) published by ECLAC estimates, based on certain marketing studies from 2000 to 2001, that almost half the connected population is less than 25 years old (49% in Brazil and 55% in Mexico) and nearly two thirds in the region have a university education. The gender gap continues in the region, although it has been closing: in 1997, 76% were men, and by 2001 in Brazil 57% were men, who spent 8.04 hours per month on line compared with 5.5 hours for women.

Summarizing the progress in this matter, there is clear evidence that those who will be best positioned to benefit from the advantages of the new technologies and access to new information and knowledge resources are those who already were in a better position. This is what the 1999 UNDP Report finds regarding ICTs: “The network society is creating parallel communications systems: one for those with income, education and – literally – connections, giving plentiful information at low cost and high speed; the other for those without connections, blocked by high barriers of time, cost and uncertainty and dependent on outdated information. With people in these two systems living and competing side by side, the advantages of connection are overpowering.” It highlights that finding solutions demands the formulation of development policies, since “the greatest danger is the complacent belief that a profitable and growing industry will solve the problem by itself. But the market alone will make global citizens only of those who can afford it.” (1999: 63)

The digital gap, in sum, is an expression of prevailing socioeconomic inequalities, which means that if we do not do something about it, it could well deepen them. By the same token, neither can we suppose that solutions aimed solely at closing the digital gap, without attacking the more fundamental causes of inequality, can alone solve development problems.

That is, for developing countries, the issue presents a new, complex challenge that, together with others that still have not been solved such as food, health, housing, education, basic services, being vital needs of their inhabitants, obliges them to design policies for the best use of their scarce resources.

In this light, there are those who argue that connectivity can only answer development issues if the necessary conditions are generated to take advantage of the information and technology. Although there are others who are skeptical of technology and maintain that ICTs have little or no relevance in countries and sectors that have not solved such fundamental issues as hunger, basic health and water supply.

Several studies have been done to identify the elements needed to create the right “enabling environment” (or “e-readiness”) for a country (or community) to take advantage of ICTs for the promotion of its development, both in terms of technological implementation as such and with regard to the appropriation and systematization of information and knowledge. Several coincide in pointing our that there is no pre-established recipe to ensure a successful application of ICTs in development strategies.

The central topic of the UNDP “Human Development Report 2001” is precisely the conditions under which developing countries are “Making new technologies work for human development,” as the title says, including a new “technology achievement index” to measure the potential for technological innovation and use. The main components of this index¹⁹ are the capacity for technological innovation (measured in patents granted and income from abroad for royalties and licenses, per capita), the degree of dissemination of recent innovations (Internet hosts and export of high and medium technological products) and older ones (telephony and electricity), and specialized knowledge (average years of schooling and rate of university students registered in scientific careers). (2001: 46)

The so-called “Digital Opportunity Taskforce” (or DOT Force, a work group on digital opportunities set up by a decision of the G8 in Okinawa in July 2000), came to somewhat similar conclusions in the report endorsed by heads of state and government of this group in Genoa (July 2001). This document considers that information and communication technologies could start a virtuous circle of sustainable development. But it also acknowledges that the digital divide is “a reflection of existing broader socioeconomic inequalities” and that the contribution of ICTs to development “is not automatic.” (2001: 4, 6, 7)

The nine action recommendations that conclude the report refer, on the one hand, to those that can be carried out within the concerned countries to “create the environment, mobilize the consensus, and set the priorities that will shape each nation’s path to digital opportunity,” and, on the other, to the role of the international community in “mobilizing resources, building partnerships, increasing coordination, extending markets, sharing innovations.” (12) It even includes a few recommendations from civil society, such as its participation in consultations for policy-making, or support for shareware in developing countries.

In spite of this open horizon, the central aim has not changed: topics that strengthen current international power structures prevail, one of whose key elements is technology control. That is why, aside from all the rhetoric, there has not been the slightest change in the criterion that understands technological transfers towards southern countries as a mere transfer of products, but not of knowledge that would make it possible for technology to be produced and developed autonomously and in accordance with the specific needs of those countries.

At the present time, the situation has become even more complicated because, due to the importance information and knowledge have acquired, there have been more regulations for privatizing them, through the new norms on intellectual property rights, which include patents and copyrights. And particularly in the digital field, since digital goods are so easy to reproduce – this being the “weak” point of the information economy – which obviously affects the high profit margins of the sector’s corporations.

Historically, the protection of intellectual property was established to favor the freedom of creation, encourage inventors, and promote contributions to society. Today it has become the safeguard of central countries and their monopolies. These are the interests that the legal structure being assembled internationally responds to, over all through the WTO, with serious consequences for southern countries. The UNDP itself (1999: 57) acknowledges that:

“ -In private research agendas money talks louder than need.

“ -Tightened intellectual property rights keep developing countries out of the knowledge sector.

“ -Patent laws do not recognize traditional knowledge and system of ownership.

“ -The rush and push of commercial interests protect profits, not people, despite the risks in the new technologies.”

In this same line, Avinash Persaud, administrative director of Global Market Analysis and Research of the State Street Bank, acknowledges that the current trend is highly unfavorable to developing countries: “It is doubtful”, he says, “that the knowledge revolution will let developing countries leapfrog to higher levels of development, as many technologists and Internet evangelists assert. In fact, the knowledge gap will likely widen the disparities between rich and poor, imprisoning many developing countries in relative poverty.” (2001)

He situates the role fulfilled by patents within this trend, inasmuch as “they do not only measure the innovation gap, but they widen it”. “In this accelerated world”, he adds, “ever less time is needed for ideas to become profitable products, which is why the recent extension and reinforcement of intellectual property rights by the World Trade Organization (WTO) resembles a power game more than a rational economic evaluation. It is not clear how far patent protection must go, but without a doubt, certain trends strengthen the advantage of the companies and countries that develop patented ideas. This imbalance drives a new wedge between rich and poor”.

Thus it is that in this “power play,” while on the one hand the protection of property and control of information and knowledge of the northern countries are strengthened, on the other there is a defense of the “free flow of information” or the “common heritage of humanity” to keep new information sources open outside their borders, such as bio-diversity, traditional indigenous medicine, etc.

This issue is also related to the “brain drain” from southern countries instigated by northern ones and their corporations, that head-hunt scientists, engineers and specialists, mainly those related to high-tech sectors. Considering the exodus of electronic programmers from India to the United States, which in the next few years could reach 100,000 persons, the UNDP (2001: 92) calculates that for this Asian country, “at the high end it brings the resource loss to two billion dollars a year.” To counteract such losses, this international agency proposes “establishing a global tax.”

To the degree that for the richest countries of the world the international priority is to consolidate a political and economic framework based on free trade – thus the importance of the WTO and intellectual property regulations – everything said afterwards simply becomes a rhetorical figure meant to hide the enormous interests in motion behind the scenes.

In effect, as the UNDP notes (2001: 5), “even in the network era, domestic policy still matters,” a proposal that is also taken up by the G8 DOT Force, as well as other multilateral agencies. The question is that with the imposition of policies to downsize the state, everything possible has been done to make the idea of “national policies” disappear. Moreover, the least the latter could demand is the establishment of legal, administrative and institutional frameworks to counteract the effects of privatization and liberalization. But according to the international norms established in the WTO framework, not even this minimum is acceptable.

Likewise, it has been recognized that another important element to take into account when entering the “information society” is education. However, in southern countries, the educational budget has been cut with the “adjustment” policies. A study done in 1997 by the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), which explores the implications of the so-called ICT revolution for developing countries, observed that the obstacles for digitized information to become relevant knowledge for development include illiteracy and the difficulty that educational and research institutions have to adapt to new ways of producing and exchanging knowledge. (Credé, 1998: 11)

The dominant logic has created a vicious circle, by which the most information-poor countries are also those with the least possibilities to take advantage of available information, as well as the greatest limitations for their development. The promise of Internet for development – inasmuch as it is based on an instrumentalist conception that leaves out structural factors and the international conditioning that threads together the history of countries – in the end is no more than a variation on the concept that has dominated relationships of North-South dependency. That is, southern countries should not aspire to be anything but markets for the information and cultural products produced in the North.

From a national development perspective, among other aspects, for countries of the South the incorporation of ICTs should above all be aimed at solving basic urgencies, such as those relating to health, education, governmental services, etc., more than the entertainment and promotion of consumption that dominates the business logic. In sum, what is needed is to restate the issue, in the sense that the question is not how the Internet will be put at the service of development, but how developing countries, in defining future projects, will establish policies to take best advantage of it and, in general, of ICTs. Only then will we see if one can fish with a computer.

Notes: